Implied Reverse Preemption by Bernstein, Anita
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 74
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
The Products Liability Restatement: Was it a
Success?
Article 3
2009
Implied Reverse Preemption
Anita Bernstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Anita Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 Brook. L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol74/iss3/3
669 
Implied Reverse Preemption 
Anita Bernstein† 
With an elaborate Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act,1 
prepared and signed during the doldrums of midsummer 2008, Congress 
signaled its revived attention to the safety of consumer goods sold in the 
United States.2 The new statute, which almost won unanimity in both 
chambers,3 announced a new scope and ambition: by increasing the 
powers of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“Commission” or 
“CPSC”) rather than removing any of them, Congress took a turn in a 
direction not seen in decades.4 The 2008 law ordered the Commission to 
write new standards for all-terrain vehicles.5 It declared a provisional ban 
on six chemicals that it suspected of disrupting human reproductive 
systems.6 It prohibited lead in products for children under twelve―this 
ban an outright rather than a provisional rule.7 It required testing of all 
new children’s products offered for sale.8 It wrote new protections for 
consumer-minded whistleblowers.9 It augmented the existing penalties 
  
 †  Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Numerous 
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comments on earlier versions of this Article, given to me inside the Brooklyn building and at a 
meeting of the Tort Theory Reading Group, to Edward Cheng, Deborah Widiss, Larry Solan, Tony 
Sebok, Ben Zipursky, Peter Schuck, Ekow Yankah, George Conk, Bob Alleman, and Malcolm 
Wheeler. Catherine Sharkey, who generously shared her expertise in preemption, is not responsible 
for any misuses I have made of her tutelage. I also thank the Brooklyn Law School faculty research 
fund for its support. 
 1 Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat. 3016 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2089 
(2006)). 
 2 The 2006 election had given the Democratic Party control of both houses for the first 
time in twelve years, making passage of this legislation possible. See Eric Lotke, Downsizing 
Government to Death: Thanks to “E. Coli Conservatism,” Weakened Government Watchdogs Have 
Put Us All at Risk, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2008, at M7. 
 3 Three Senators and one member of the House of Representatives voted no. Editorial, 
No Playing Around with Toy Safety: Congress Rightly Sets Tough Standards, and Backs Them up 
with Funding, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 4, 2008, at 12. 
 4 See Aliya Sternstein, Product Safety Law Overhaul on Track to Clear Senate After 
Passing House, CONG. Q. TODAY, Jul. 30, 2008 (declaring that the new statute was “the most 
significant overhaul” of consumer safety laws in forty years (quoting Rep. John Dingell)); Editorial, 
The President and Product Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008, at A18 (praising the new statute). 
 5 Pub. L. No.110-314, § 232, 122 Stat. at 3071-72. 
 6 Id. § 108, 122 Stat. at 3036-37. 
 7 Id. § 101(a), 122 Stat. at 3017; 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(2)(2008). 
 8 Pub. L. No. 110-314, §102, 122 Stat. at 3022. 
 9 Id. § 219.  
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for violating consumer law.10 It invited state attorneys general into the 
federal courts to enforce some of its provisions.11  
Federal intervention in consumer safety as a plenary category 
began in the 1960s, when Congress established a National Commission 
on Product Safety to explore what the United States government could 
do to reduce product-caused injuries.12 Congress passed the Consumer 
Product Safety Act (“CPSA”) in 1972.13 In its original form the CPSA 
defined consumer products broadly,14 exempting only a handful of 
manufactured items from its provisions.15 Congress bestowed on the 
newly created Consumer Product Safety Commission a wide array of 
“enforcement tools,” including powers to set standards, seize and 
condemn goods, prohibit the sale of products, and order recalls.16  
Soon after its inception, burdened by onerous procedures that 
Congress had mandated, however, the Commission began to perform at a 
disappointing level.17 Its bureaucratic weakness got a boost from 
conservative ideology in 1981, when Congress started to roll back the 
federal presence in consumer regulation.18 A “deregulation-minded 
chairman,” Terry Scanlon, arrived in the mid-1980s to lead the 
Commission into quiescence.19 Reagan-era retrenchments from consumer 
  
 10 Id. § 217.  
 11 Id. § 218. 
 12 See Teresa M. Schwartz, The Consumer Product Safety Commission: A Flawed 
Product of the Consumer Decade, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 32, 36 (1982). 
 13 For a history of the statute published soon after its enactment, see Antonin Scalia & 
Frank Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 899, 
899-904 (1973). 
 14 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1) (2006) (referring to “any article, or component part thereof, 
produced or distributed for sale to a consumer”). 
 15 Scalia & Goodman, supra note 13, at 902 (noting tobacco, firearms, and products 
covered by other federal legislation, such as boats, cosmetics, food, and aircraft). 
 16 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 42-43. The Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(“CPSC” or “Commission”) was established by statute in 1972. 15 U.S.C. § 2053. In this Article I 
occasionally refer to the Commission as an “agency,” a term some prefer to reserve for a single-
administrator entity more closely associated with a presidential administration; Congress, led by 
Democrats, originally wrote the Consumer Product Safety Act (“CPSA”) to make the Commission 
“independent” from the Nixon presidency. Robert S. Adler, From “Model Agency” to Basket Case—
Can the Consumer Product Safety Commission Be Redeemed?, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 82 n.123, 83 
n.125 (1989). It functions as a “collegial body” of commissioners. See id. at 82. Commissioners are 
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, cannot all be members of the 
same political party, and serve staggered terms of seven years, subject to removal by the President 
“for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” 15 U.S.C. § 2053. 
 17 See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 34-35. 
 18 See infra Part III.B. 
 19 John Hood, Let the Market Protect Consumer Safety, 40 THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON 
LIBERTY (Apr. 1990), available at http://www.fee.org/Publications/the-Freeman/article.asp?aid=648 
(praising Scanlon’s views on regulation); see also JOAN CLAYBROOK AND THE STAFF OF PUBLIC 
CITIZEN, RETREAT FROM SAFETY: REAGAN’S ATTACK ON AMERICA’S HEALTH 58-70 (1984) 
(offering illustrations of regulatory retreat for consumer products).  
  Following CPSC practice, I refer to the head of the CPSC as its chairman, even though 
women heads of the agency occupy more space in this Article than do CPSC chairmen S. John 
Byington, Terry Scanlon, Richard Simpson, and Hal Stratton. 
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safety regulation stayed in place through subsequent presidential 
administrations until the 2008 mandate and appropriations.20 
Observers will note an oscillation: steps forward, steps back, 
steps forward. Until 1972, federal law had taken no plenary regulatory 
position on consumer safety. Forward: The 1972 Consumer Product 
Safety Act launched an era of national engagement. Backward: Although 
Congress never repealed the Consumer Product Safety Act, the federal 
government spent years in steady retreat from its old agenda. Forward: 
the 2008 expansion of programs, penalties, and appropriations. 
In this Article, I contend that congressional oscillation on 
consumer safety can inform the most incendiary topic in current 
American products liability: the law of preemption. Within products 
liability discourse, the term preemption (which has a large set of other 
meanings outside the scope of the Article) refers specifically to the 
affirmative defense that will extinguish actions for personal injury 
brought under the common law of torts.21 In a preemption scenario, a 
plaintiff attributes an injury to a product defect. The defendant seller 
responds by saying that a particular federal regulation on point preempts 
the claim—because Congress, exercising a supreme legislative power, 
has said so—and accordingly any court applying state law must dismiss 
it. 
Preemption divides into two categories. “Express” preemption is 
present when Congress makes an overt statement about its intent to 
foreclose common-law tort liability.22 Congress rarely chooses to make 
such a statement, perhaps because its members, in perpetual pursuit of 
campaign funds to get reelected, worry that taking a stand on the divisive 
  
 20 But see The Gale Group, Inc., Small Business Encyclopedia: Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC), www.answers.com/topic/consumer-product-safety-commission (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2009) (identifying 1999 as a “vigorous” year for the Commission; in 1999 it “issued more 
than 300 product recalls” and “levied approximately ten times the amount of fines on companies that 
it had assessed a decade earlier”). As this Article goes to press, I cannot confirm my provisional 
belief that the 2008 legislation marks a significant shift. Should the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act reforms prove thin or illusory, my thesis remains the same.  
 21 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 940 (2d ed. 2008) (describing 
preemption as a defense to liability). This working definition of preemption excludes broader 
alternative understandings. See id. at 969 (discussing preemption of state regulations); Richard C. 
Ausness, “After You, My Dear Alphonse!”: Should the Courts Defer to the FDA’s New 
Interpretation of § 360k(a) of the Medical Device Amendments?, 80 TUL. L. REV. 727, 734 & n.50 
(2006) (describing applications of preemption that do not entirely immunize defendants); Betsy J. 
Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 
599, 562 n.14 (1997) (noting that, in addition to common law claims, state statutory remedies and 
punitive damages are amenable to preemption). Professor Ausness’s list of preemption cases 
includes International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (permitting tort liability, but 
holding that the Clean Water Act restricted plaintiffs to the law of only one state), and Arkansas 
Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582-84 (1981) (permitting liability, but holding that state 
doctrine on the calculation of contract damages was preempted under the Natural Gas Act). Id. at 
734 n.50. This Article, by contrast, discusses preemption only insofar as it forecloses state tort 
liability. 
 22 OWEN, supra note 21, at 941. 
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subject of liability will offend financers.23 When Congress does speak 
overtly about preemption, it frequently will do so from two sides of its 
mouth: the same statute can contain both a preemption clause purporting 
to displace all contrary state regulation, perhaps including regulation by 
tort law, and a savings clause, purporting to preserve state tort liability.24  
By these means Congress punts its dilemma to the judiciary,25 
and so preemption is found mainly in the other category, “implied” 
preemption, where courts read into a statute a pertinent congressional 
intent: that is, either to occupy a field through federal regulation (“field 
preemption”) or to set up a regulatory scheme inconsistent in its 
particulars with what injured litigants could receive if they prevailed 
under state tort law (often called “conflict preemption”).26 Conflict 
preemption is the type that often arises as an affirmative defense to 
personal injury claims, but either type of preemption can keep injured 
plaintiffs out of court. Part I gives a summary of implied preemption 
doctrine. This Part functions here mainly as background for the Article’s 
more novel claim.  
Congressional oscillation, I argue, shows the need for another 
judge-made doctrine about preemption of tort liability. The consumer 
product safety example shows that Congress will occasionally move in 
more than one direction with respect to regulating industries, services, or 
public safety generally. The existence of implied preemption calls for a 
complementary judicial inference to recognize the abandonment of an 
earlier regulatory design. Any court empowered to infer that Congress 
  
 23 See generally Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Corporate Campaign 
Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation, 48 J.L. & ECON. 41 (2005) 
(describing relations between fundraising and legislative duties for members of the House of 
Representatives). 
 24 Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law 
Products Liability Claims, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 415, 416 & n.5 (2008) (citing, inter alia, 
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the Federal Boat Safety Act of 
1971). 
 25 Grey, supra note 21, at 618; id. at 617 (“Congress knows how to preempt state 
common law claims expressly and has demonstrated its ability to do so a number times. Therefore, 
courts should not preempt matters beyond the express language of a federal state.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 449, 450 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Institutional Approach] (using the punt 
metaphor).  
 26 Once one has delineated express and implied preemption—and even between these 
two broad concepts the line is not bright, see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (applying 
express-preemption and implied-preemption analysis to overlapping questions)—the next round of 
categorization, which sometimes includes “obstacle” as well as “field” and “conflict” preemption, 
becomes difficult. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) 
(dividing implied preemption into “field” and “conflict” categories); English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 
U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990) (suggesting that “field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict 
pre-emption”); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. L. REV. 
695, 699-700 (2008) (favoring “obstacle preemption” over “conflict preemption”); Rachel Mervis, 
Furthering Consumer Safety of Medical Devices: The Necessity of a Device-Specific State Law as 
Required for Express Preemption Under the MDA, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 387, 395 n.38 (2005) 
(identifying three types of preemption: “express, implied, and conflict”); see also Grey, supra note 
21, at 622-27 (dividing “direct conflict” preemption into “obstacle conflict” and “‘impossibility’ 
conflict”). 
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intended to occupy a field or impose a scheme, when Congress did not 
announce this path expressly, is also empowered to infer a congressional 
retreat.27  
The parallel from express preemption is repeal. Here is an 
illustration. Suppose that in year X, Congress passes the Goldhelmet 
Safety Act (“GSA”), declaring in the statute that compliance with federal 
regulations pertaining to the manufacture and sale of solid-gold 
motorcycle helmets insulates sellers from tort liability. To keep 
complication out of the hypothetical, the statute contains no savings 
clause of any kind. It plainly preempts. The President signs the new law. 
As long as the GSA is in effect, plaintiffs who attribute injury to helmets 
made in accord with GSA requirements may not sue manufacturers or 
other sellers: express preemption kills their claims. Sometime after year 
X, in year Y, Congress takes the federal government out of the gold-
helmet regulation business by repealing the GSA. Or it leaves other parts 
of the GSA in the United States Code, but repeals the express-
preemption provision. When the repeal goes into effect, persons who 
attribute injury to their gold helmets may sue. Congress has abandoned 
its express preemption.28 
Similar reasoning should govern implied preemption. Any 
congressional scheme to occupy a field or establish comprehensive 
regulation can be abandoned. Overt, express takeovers of fields or 
comprehensive regulatory schemes done through federal legislation and 
rulemaking are relatively easy to observe; by contrast, a takeover or a 
comprehensive design that a court can educe only through inference 
disappears by means other than a written declaration. Abandonments of 
these preemptive initiatives render obsolete any earlier judicial inference 
that might have found a congressional intent to preempt. Just as courts 
find implied preemption where circumstances warrant, they must also, 
again only where circumstances warrant, infer a retreat from implied 
preemption. I discuss this inference of retreat by Congress, which I call 
“implied reverse preemption,”29 in Part II. 
  
 27 This proposal joins others I have presented as recommendations to judges who hear 
claims of injury. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through 
Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1051, 1082-98 (2007) (proposing a cause of action for 
persons who can show they suffered physical harm from a drug’s failure to live up to the promises 
on its label); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 
521-24 (1997) (offering a draft jury instruction for hostile-environment sexual harassment claims). 
 28 See Anant S. Narayanan, Note, Standards of Protection for Databases in the European 
Community and the United States: Feist and the Myth of Creative Originality, 27 GEO. WASH. J. 
INT’L L. & ECON. 457, 498 (1994) (observing that “Congress can always modify or repeal any 
existing federal statutory preemption”). 
 29 “Reverse preemption” is sometimes used to describe restraint or abstention by 
Congress in deference to state prerogatives. Courts apply the term to regulation of the insurance 
industry under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, 543 F.3d 744, 752 (5th Cir. 2008); Genord v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 440 F.3d 802, 805 
(6th Cir. 2006); In re Med. Care Mgmt. Co., 361 B.R. 863, 871 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2003). 
Commentators extend it to judicial refusals to apply federal law in a domain that is traditionally left 
to state authority. Reverse preemption of this sort has both detractors and admirers. Compare Daniel 
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As scholars have noted, the indicators of a tacit decision by 
Congress to bar state tort claims are both unclear and controversial,30 and 
analogous difficulties necessarily occlude the reverse-preemption 
analysis. Implied reverse preemption is, however, easier to use than 
implied preemption in one crucial respect: Congress manifests its retreat 
from a domain more transparently than it manifests its intent to preclude 
tort liability. Implied reverse preemption, in this respect very different 
from implied preemption, gives courts distinct markers of congressional 
intent to look for. In Part II, I propose some criteria for courts to find 
implied reverse preemption. Fulfillment of the criteria suggests that 
Congress has pulled back from an inferred early agenda and no longer 
forecloses tort liability. 
Both courts and scholars of preemption recognize that although 
Congress, as the originator and source of congressional intent, is central 
to any analysis of preemption, the executive branch of government—
represented here by the agency charged with enforcement of a statutory 
mandate—plays its own role in determining whether injured persons can 
bring claims under state law. Constitutional and administrative laws 
recognize the possibility of delegation, whereby Congress cedes 
decisionmaking power to a federal agency.31 Federal agencies have 
manifested their belief that this delegation has given them the power to 
preempt state tort claims. Some courts have accepted these announced 
beliefs as authoritative.32 With more unanimity, courts have held that 
agencies must comply with statutory obligations even when Congress 
has not appropriated the necessary funds.33 Accordingly, any federal 
  
A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1, 27 (2008) (identifying an unhealthy reverse 
preemption in state laws that defeat the purposes of antitrust law as written by Congress), with 
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death Penalty is “Cruel and Unusual,” 74 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 819, 879-80 (2006) (extolling a form of reverse preemption whereby the choice of a 
state to have no death penalty would outweigh a federal statutory death penalty for crimes 
committed in that state). I use “implied reverse preemption” here very differently, as a short form of 
“inferred retreat from a previously inferred preemption.” 
 30 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 298 (2000) (commenting that the 
Supreme Court has left the presumption against preemption indeterminate); Sharkey, Institutional 
Approach, supra note 25, at 454 (“It is exceedingly difficult to demonstrate that any consistent 
principle or explanatory variable emerges from the Supreme Court’s products liability preemption 
jurisprudence.”). See generally OWEN, supra note 21, at 939-40 (summarizing the consensus among 
commentators that preemption is “a mess” (citation omitted)). 
 31 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) 
(stating that when “Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation”).  
 32 Among federal agencies, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has attracted the 
most attention on this point. See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting 
the FDA’s participation in the appeal as amicus curiae); Ausness, supra note 21, at 55-56. Colacicco 
v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d, 521 F.3d 253, 275-76 (3d Cir. 
2008), vacated, No. 08-437, 2009 WL 578682 (U.S. Mar. 9, 2009), marked the first successful 
attempt in the federal appellate courts to invoke the FDA preamble as establishing preemption. 
 33 Cherokee Nation v. Levitt, 543 U.S. 631, 640-42 (2005) (forcing the Department of 
Health and Human Services to pay sums it owed to two Indian tribes, notwithstanding its contention 
that Congress had not appropriated the money it needed); N. Y. Airways, Inc. v. United States, 369 
F.2d 743, 748 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
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agency holding assigned authority over safety, be it “independent” or 
subordinated to a Cabinet department, has a presence distinct from that 
of Congress in the setting of regulatory policies that pertain to 
preemption.34 
For judges and policymakers receptive to the thesis of this 
Article, it remains an open question which statutes and agencies will give 
the judiciary instances of implied reverse preemption to find; the 
experience of consumer safety is clear enough to provide a model of the 
phenomenon. Beginning either in 1976 or 1981, and continuing until 
2008,35 Congress knocked the teeth from the Consumer Product Safety 
Act and weakened the Consumer Product Safety Commission, whose 
leaders appeared to welcome rather than resist the stripping of their 
power. Unity and bipartisanship pervaded this reversal; both Democrats 
and Republicans pursued statutory rollback and a reduction in agency 
power.36 Part III presents these undisputed developments without 
argument or criticism: I have my views about the federal interest in 
consumer safety, but they are of no moment here. The point of Part III is 
that at some point during a period of seventeen years, Congress ceased to 
intend, if it ever did intend, to assert a federal safety-regulatory stance 
that precluded tort liability for injuries attributed to consumer products.37 
Congress chose not to occupy the field of consumer safety, nor to 
establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme. This absence or 
withdrawal of preemption left consumer product safety open to the 
powers and prerogatives of state law, especially state tort liability. 
Implied reverse preemption and traditional preemption function 
together harmoniously in the adversary binary of manufacturer-
defendants versus consumer-plaintiffs. I will even claim that acceptance 
  
 34 Independent federal agencies, of which the CPSC is one, traditionally respond more 
closely to Congress than to the President. Geoffrey P. Miller, Introduction: The Debate Over 
Independent Agencies in Light of Empirical Evidence, 1988 DUKE L. J. 215, 218.  
 35 Though unanimous on the point that the CPSC plunged into somnolence during the 
Reagan years, commentators disagree on when this descent began. One publication that focuses on 
industry rather than consumers, the Small Business Encyclopedia, deemed 1999 a turnaround year. 
See supra note 20; see also infra Part III.B. (exploring the ambiguous decline of federal consumer 
safety regulation in the late Carter and early Reagan presidential administrations). 
 36 See E. MARLA FELCHER, IT’S NO ACCIDENT: HOW CORPORATIONS SELL DANGEROUS 
BABY PRODUCTS 30 (2001) (noting that President Jimmy Carter explored abolishing the CPSC in 
1977). Bill Clinton put through staffing cuts at the agency in 1995 and 1998. See Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm’n, Memorandum, 1999 Budget Recommendation (July 1, 1997), available at 
http://www.cpsc.gov/LIBRARY/FOIA/FOIA97/BRIEF/BP9739.PDF. On Republican rollbacks, see 
infra notes 128-133 and accompanying text. 
 37 This inference rests on my understanding that preemption is different from a 
congressional grant of mere immunity. Implied preemption presumes that Congress has substituted 
federal regulation for state-based tort liability as a means to promote consumer safety; it casts tort 
claims as obstructing a scheme that benefits consumers. If this premise is correct, then implied 
reverse preemption becomes a necessary counterpart to implied preemption, because as soon as 
Congress no longer desires to promote safety through federal regulation, immediately tort claims, or 
“regulation through litigation,” become the only available instrument of safety law. Retaining 
preemption under those circumstances would therefore generate only immunity, not safety. See 
generally Big Loss for Big Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A36 (praising the Supreme Court 
for insisting that preemption law does not require immunity for cigarette manufacturers).  
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of this new doctrine would make the work of preemption litigation more 
satisfying for lawyers and judges. At present, with only preemption and 
not implied reverse preemption available to them, lawyers on both sides 
immerse themselves in assembling decisional law that favors their 
clients’ stance on a yes/no affirmative defense and try to distinguish the 
contrary line.38 Judges find either preemption or no preemption. 
Everyone on the battleground has a set of tasks that are relatively 
mechanical.  
The new front opened by implied reverse preemption brings a 
healthy challenge to precedents that had barred tort liability. Lawyers 
build an answer to the question of whether old findings of a 
congressional intent to preempt have been superseded. Because the 
evidence to support implied reverse preemption comes from relatively 
intelligible and accessible sources—amendments, budgets, agency 
announcements—courts could adjudicate the issue “on papers,” using 
memoranda and exhibits rather than costly stagings like Daubert 
hearings. Through this doctrine, judges would make preemption more 
even-handed and more consistent with law as legislators make it.  
I. IMPLIED PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LIABILITY: INFERRING A 
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE DESIGN TO BAR PERSONAL INJURY 
CLAIMS 
A. To Begin: Congressional Intent 
Under varied sources of doctrine, of which the Supremacy 
Clause of the United States Constitution has garnered the most 
attention,39 state law must yield to contrary federal law. The eighteenth-
century declaration of congressional supremacy in the Constitution 
probably did not anticipate the twentieth-century rise of federal power 
under the Commerce Clause, suggesting that the searches for 
congressional intent to preempt inconsistent state law that courts now 
undertake may be inconsistent with the framers’ design.40 Nevertheless, 
the constitutional base from which courts find preemption today is 
solid.41 In its preemption decisions, the Supreme Court frequently pauses 
to pledge fealty to legislative intent, which it has called “the ultimate 
touchstone” in preemption analysis.42 
  
 38 See infra Part III.A (assembling cases that support an inference of preemption by the 
CPSA). 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 
 40 See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 785-
95 (1994); see also Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. 
REV. 967, 972 (2002) [hereinafter Davis, Unmasking]; Nelson, supra note 30, at 227.  
 41 See Wyeth, Inc. v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1199 (2009); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).  
 42 For expressions of the Court’s devotion to congressional intent in preemption 
decisions, see Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 (2008); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 
 
2009] IMPLIED REVERSE PREEMPTION 677 
Courts considering assertions of implied preemption must, at 
least in principle, construe statutes with a “presumption against 
preemption,” a canon first declared by the Supreme Court in 1926.43 
Although this presumption appears to be of doubtful force,44 the Court 
has never declared it dead, and in more recent preemption decisions the 
Court has reiterated the presumption to hold that tort claims could 
proceed.45 Any attempt to understand or enhance preemption doctrine 
accordingly must reckon with the canon of construction that reminds 
courts not to rush to this inference unless Congress has made clear its 
preemptive intent. Looking ahead to the implied reverse preemption 
thesis of this Article, we can make use of the canon: A presumption 
against preemption, if it has any impact at all, should affect 
interpretations not only of whether preemption exists, but how long it 
stays alive in a statute. The canon tells courts to recognize the possibility 
that Congress has abandoned an earlier ambition to preempt.  
Another point of statutory interpretation that can inform implied 
reverse preemption relates to drawing inferences from a legislature’s 
failure to act. Following what William Eskridge has called the 
acquiescence rule, federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, have held 
that a failure by Congress to respond to the judicial construction of a 
statute signals congressional acceptance of that decision.46 This inference 
will often be ill-founded in fact.47 Congress might not have considered 
the judicial decision in question; it might have disagreed with it but 
failed to make a priority of reversing the holding; it might have rejected 
it but become frozen on the question of how to respond.48 Nevertheless, 
courts will sometimes draw this inference of acceptance.  
Inferring legislative acceptance from legislative inaction 
suggests a precedent for courts as they consider whether to infer retreat 
  
537 U.S. 51, 69 (2002); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text. But see Keith N. Hylton, 
Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 206 (2008) 
(arguing that courts do not care about congressional intent and instead choose to find preemption 
when they perceive the relevant agency to be independent and when they perceive a high “degree of 
congruence between the regulatory and common law standards” (emphasis omitted)). 
 43 Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) (“The intention of 
Congress to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested.”). The most-
cited presumption-against-preemption decision is Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 
230-31 (1947).  
 44 See Davis, Unmasking, supra note 40, at 972 (questioning whether the presumption 
against preemption ever existed).  
 45 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences 
LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).  
 46 Eskridge cites Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) (declaring that 
this mission “is persuasive of legislative recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one”) 
and Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (“Congress has had the ruling under 
consideration but has not seen fit” to write new law). WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 242 (1994). 
 47 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 
70 (1988); Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory 
Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 186-96 (1989).  
 48 I thank Deborah Widiss for her careful articulation of this point.  
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by Congress from an earlier inferred preemption. Any inference of an 
acquiescence by the legislature, to which many courts are quick to leap, 
makes strenuous demands on judges. They must ignore the realities 
noted above that contradict acquiescence by Congress (ignorance of the 
new judicial interpretation, inability to agree on an expression of 
disagreement, and so on), as well as the larger reality that this legislature 
“is a discontinuous decision maker.”49 Membership in the body turns 
over. Even if membership in a legislature could stay fixed, the focus of 
its legislation will change form.50  These demands do not burden judges 
who apply the implied reverse preemption that this Article advocates. 
Judges can proceed without blinkering themselves to the probabilities, 
well gathered by Eskridge, that suggest a misunderstanding of 
congressional inaction. Inferring distraction, disengagement, or the 
abandonment of a once-held legislative goal calls for much less 
conjecture than the established inference of embrace and agreement.  
B. Speculating About Why Congress Would Want to Bar Personal 
Injury Claims 
The doctrine of preemption recognizes that Congress can have 
plans that are inconsistent with state tort liability. Two of these 
legislative designs are familiar to courts. First, Congress might intend to 
occupy a field so completely that any state-level contribution to the 
regulatory endeavor could not supplement it.51 Second, Congress might 
have particular purposes that state tort law would obstruct by opening the 
possibility of a contrary result.52  
Both state-tort and federal-agency modes of regulation can make 
sense as sources of safety, and Congress might desire either path to the 
destination of fewer injuries in particular and public welfare in general. 
When policymakers understand the federal regulatory path as 
preemptive, however, they add asymmetry to the paths: federal 
rulemaking extinguishes tort claims, but tort claims do not extinguish 
  
 49 ESKRIDGE, supra note 46, at 247. 
 50 Eskridge, a gay activist as well as a scholar of statutory interpretation, gives the 
example of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, written to bar mentally ill persons from 
entering the United States. The Public Health Service, enforcing a 1950s view of mental health, 
understood the statute to exclude homosexual persons. In 1979 the PHS revered this position, 
reinterpreting the statute in light of charged circumstances. Id. at 51-55. 
 51 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 
461 U.S. 190, 212-13 (1983) (concluding that Congress had occupied the field of regulating nuclear 
plants); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) (identifying 
regulation of aircraft noise as another federal domain); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218, 229-30 (1947) (identifying grain-elevator regulation as a field that Congress had occupied).  
 52  See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (reviewing 
instances of conflict preemption in the Supreme Court); Russo v. Ballard Med. Prods., 550 F.3d 
1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing the difference between field preemption and conflict 
preemption). 
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federal rulemaking.53 Even at its most potent, tort liability can only 
hamper or obstruct a federal regulatory scheme. Because a finding of 
preemption makes the federal regulatory role a destroyer―in contrast to 
a finding of no preemption, which does not destroy the regulatory 
alternative―an inference of preemption requires courts to identify a 
congressional agenda consistent not only with favoring the federal-
regulatory mode but with actively rejecting and repudiating tort liability.  
A couple of rationales for this congressional agenda are 
available. Both have implications for implied reverse preemption as well.  
1. Conflict Preemption and Field Preemption  
Conflict or obstacle preemption is the plausible type of implied 
preemption for personal injury claims. The alternative, “field 
preemption,” usually applies to traditionally federal domains,54 and tort 
law governing personal injuries is traditionally left to the states.55 State 
governments hold a “police power[] to legislate as to the protection of 
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”56 Tort liability 
is central to their police power.57 
Field preemption could plausibly arise, however, should 
Congress decide that state tort liability interferes with its regulation of a 
field. Discussing preemption of drug claims, for example, Richard 
Epstein has nominated as a possible “field” the effort by Congress to 
enhance innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, making regulation more 
streamlined and centralized.58 Should courts agree that Congress has 
chosen this field preemption, a range of personal injury actions would 
fall away from American dockets. Though cogent, the suggestion has not 
persuaded judges to identify field preemption of pharmaceuticals 
complaints in particular, or of products liability complaints in general. 
Field preemption appears too vast and ambitious for courts to assert its 
existence without clearer guidance from Congress.  
Judges and commentators are more inclined to find conflict 
preemption of personal injury claims when the result that a plaintiff is 
seeking through litigation would diverge from what Congress intended. 
  
 53 The anomaly has drawn scholarly attention. See OWEN, supra note 21, at 969 (noting 
that “there is in fact no reason, as a general matter, why products safety regulation and products 
liability litigation cannot comfortably co-exist”).  
 54 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
 55 See Grey, supra note 21, at 622 (arguing that field preemption “has no legitimate role 
when the issue is whether Congress has preempted state tort remedies”). 
 56 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)). 
 57 Grey, supra note 21, at 613.  
 58 See Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 54 (2008), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/ 
2008/29/LRColl2008n29Epstein.pdf; Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort 
Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. art. 
5, at 30-31 (2006). 
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The clearest example of such an inferred congressional design appears in 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,59 where the Supreme Court, in a 
five-to-four decision, determined that the plaintiff had to lose because 
what she desired clashed with a federal mandate to deny her this desire. 
Implied preemption in Geier came from the National Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, which forbade states from maintaining a 
motor vehicle standard not “identical” to the federal safety standard.60 
Alexis Geier objected to the lack of an airbag in a Honda vehicle, 
contending that the vehicular design was defective; the standard in effect 
at the time had condoned the no-airbag design.61 Because the plaintiff 
could prevail only through a state-tort judgment that would condemn the 
absence of an airbag, the Court concluded that her claim conflicted with 
the permissiveness that federal standards had conscientiously installed 
and thus was preempted.62 
As applied to defeat products liability under state tort law, both 
field preemption (which courts do not use for this purpose) and conflict 
preemption as exemplified by Geier rest on a premise that Congress has 
installed a federal regulatory scheme that functions actively and 
deliberately to foster safety. Although inferring preemption has the same 
effect on liability as does simple immunity for defendants—plaintiffs’ 
claims are dismissed—the rationale for this effect is very different from 
any rationale for immunity.63 Congress might want to immunize a sector 
from tort liability for numerous varied reasons, but the reason for a 
preemptive regulatory scheme must be safety.64  Should Congress lose its 
desire to foster safety through the regulatory scheme and, through its 
actions or inactions, cause the scheme to lose force, then this shift 
eliminates both field preemption and conflict preemption. 
2. Regard for an Agency  
Going beyond the doctrinal categories of field preemption and 
conflict preemption, another rationale can underlie the congressional 
decision to foreclose tort liability: Congress might regard a federal 
agency as the more competent regulator. For this suggestion I rely on, 
and extrapolate from, Catherine Sharkey’s work on agency deference.65  
  
 59 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 60 Id. at 867. 
 61  Id. at 865. 
 62  Id. at 866. 
 63 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 64  Or so I presume. I thank Cathy Sharkey for urging me to state the premise and thereby 
clarify my argument for readers who may have joined the preemption debate from a contrary starting 
point.  
 65 Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25, at 455; Samuel Issacharoff & 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Supreme Court Preemption: The Contested Middle Ground of Products 
Liability, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 194, 195 (Richard A. 
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). For related commentary on the possibility that agency 
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Sharkey argues that the best predictor of what the Supreme Court 
will do with a preemption claim is the position on preemption that the 
relevant agency has asserted.66 This position will vary: agencies turn out 
“just as likely, if not more likely,” to oppose preemption as favor it.67 The 
same agency will articulate more than one stance. For example, the Food 
and Drug Administration argued for preemption in Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiff’s Legal Committee68 and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.69 but against 
preemption in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr;70 the National Highway and 
Traffic Safety Administration wanted Alexis Geier to lose on 
preemption71 but opposed preemption in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick;72 
the Supreme Court, finding preemption in three of these cases and 
declining to find it in the other two, sided with the agency in all five.73 
Because the Court “has been cryptic at best” on “what stands behind 
such deference to agency views,”74 Sharkey is forced to supply her own 
rationale for deference to an agency in its interpretive (as contrasted to 
regulatory) role. Concluding that agencies are often well situated to 
know the relative merits of a state-tort versus a federal-agency fix, 
Sharkey encourages courts to apply “Skidmore deference” to agency 
views on preemption.75 A Skidmore judicial stance would respect the 
comparative advantage of an agency to know “whether a uniform federal 
regulatory policy should exist.”76  
This panoramic version of deference makes a point pertaining to 
congressional intent and agency power: Regardless of whether the 
Supreme Court should accept or reject a particular claim of preemption 
(a question Sharkey builds a model to answer), any particular instance of 
regulation originates at least in part in a view that Congress had about 
relative institutional competence. On occasions that warrant deference to 
agency wishes, Congress would have believed that the empowered 
agency is better positioned than state tort liability to resolve one iteration 
of the recurring question: Do we need a uniform federal rule here?77 Like 
  
regulation might be more competent than tort liability at achieving particular ends, see Hylton, supra 
note 42, at 219-20 (noting the importance of judicial, as contrasted to congressional, regard for an 
agency); Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the 
Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 76 (2008) (comparing the “regulatory toolkit” that 
state tort liability and federal rules each offer). 
 66 Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25, at 471. 
 67 Id. at 475. 
 68 See 531 U.S. 341, 347-51 (2001). 
 69 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008). 
 70 See 518 U.S. 470, 498-500 (1996). 
 71 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000). 
 72 See 514 U.S. 280, 285 (1995). 
 73 Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25, at 477.  
 74 Id. at 471-72. 
 75 Id. at 491-96 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
 76 Id. at 484. 
 77 Ascribing this inquiry to Congress, keeper of the vaunted congressional intent, seems 
strained, as Keith Hylton has contended. See generally Hylton, supra note 42 (arguing that it is 
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any other faith, congressional faith in the superior power of an agency 
can dwindle or disappear. If the judgment about agency superiority rests 
on facts rather than, or in addition to, faith or ideology, this judgment too 
can recede when facts change.   
II. IMPLIED REVERSE PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT LIABILITY: 
INFERRING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ANY JUDICIALLY INFERRED 
BAR OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS THAT MAY HAVE ONCE 
EXISTED 
 
Here we pursue the thesis of this Article: The exercise of 
drawing inferences about what a legislature once intended with respect to 
regulation necessarily entails the possibility of inferring that the 
legislature has relinquished an older inferred intent on this point. Any 
doctrine of implied preemption that does not recognize the possibility of 
abandoning a once-held preemptive scheme cuts courts off from reality. 
Dropping the regulatory ball is as normal and predictable―just as 
integral to regulation―as picking it up. This Part builds on the standard 
account of congressional intent by exploring congressional retreat from 
safety initiatives. After considering the markers of abandonment that 
Congress makes public, the Part proceeds to discuss abandonment as 
manifested by an agency.  
A. Congressional Abandonment 
Congress has at hand three devices to express its intentions 
regarding the launch of a regulatory agenda. To start, it can vote to 
approve a new statute that provides for agency rulemaking. Second, it 
can appropriate funds to support a federal agency in this initiative. Third, 
it can return to the statute as needed, codifying amendments to take into 
account developments in the regulated sector. The last two prerogatives 
are also at the center of any inferable withdrawal of regulation. Congress 
can withdraw from previous levels of appropriation, and it can enact 
amendments that contract or undermine the original regulatory 
endeavor.78   
1. Appropriations in Retreat  
The monolithic Congress that, according to preemption doctrine, 
chooses to express what lies at the core of preemption―its singular 
intent to occupy a field or establish a comprehensive scheme of 
regulation incompatible with tort liability, or perhaps to opine on agency 
  
judges who hold a view about relative institutional competence). Regardless of who asks it, 
however, the question is central to any analysis of preemption. 
 78 Overt repeal of a statute, a reversal of the first prerogative, eliminates the need for 
inferring. 
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competence79―is a fiction, as explained by the literatures on public 
choice, game theory, and other academic genres.80 With respect to any 
issue before it, Congress has many intents and agendas, never just one. 
An aspect of its multiplicity that pertains to implied reverse preemption 
is the gap between substantive law-writing and appropriations. To effect 
a legislative change that requires money to proceed, a safety-reform 
coalition must first get the new statute written and then get it funded. 
Both houses of Congress have powerful appropriations committees that 
hold authority over federal disbursements.81 It is fairly common for 
Congress not to appropriate funds to pay for a new law it voted to 
enact.82  
This manifested ambivalence complicates the use of an 
appropriations criterion to draw any legal conclusion, not just the implied 
reverse preemption conclusion of this Article, because Congress can 
express conflicting desires about a new piece of legislation. Legislators 
can vote for a measure (implying congressional acceptance) yet not fund 
it (implying congressional rejection). Regardless of whether they find the 
response mixed or even contradictory, however, courts must consider the 
money-message that Congress sends to them. Their acceptance of 
implied preemption as doctrine has committed courts to drawing 
inferences about what Congress wants. As the case law on implied 
preemption indicates, manifestations of these wants emerge shrouded in 
ambiguity and doubt.83  
Committed to an appropriations analysis, courts considering 
implied reverse preemption could begin with a metric of decline in 
spending. This metric would direct judicial attention to an inflation-
adjusted drop in appropriations over a period of years for the regulatory 
entity empowered to enforce what Congress has mandated. A court can 
infer that other things being equal, fewer dollars appropriated expresses 
  
 79 See supra Part I.B. 
 80 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 46, at 247-48 (summarizing legal process conclusions); 
Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 249-52 (1992) (explaining congressional intent in a public-
choice perspective); Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REV. 629, 665-70 (2008) 
(applying game theory to legislative behaviors). 
 81 The authority of appropriations committees in Congress derives from the Constitution, 
which provides that “[m]oney shall be drawn from the treasury” only “in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law,” in a section describing the powers of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
sec. 9, cl. 7. 
 82 “New programs receive funding only if they can fit within predetermined limits. They 
can succeed legislatively only if some previously funded programs receive fewer funds or no money 
at all.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 184 (2000). 
 83 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. For courts reviewing claims of implied 
reverse preemption, a plausible response to the funding gap would be to accept the enactment of 
substantive regulatory legislation as an expression of congressional interest, and after a reasonable 
interval (perhaps two years) to require Congress either to show observers the money, so to speak, or 
acknowledge that its earlier enactment did not articulate a serious regulatory plan.  
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less desire to regulate.84 Use of this metric requires attention to the 
surrounding budgetary scene: agency budgets often include increases 
unrelated to regulatory policy. Federal agencies sometimes have to 
augment their expenditures on such items as mandatory pay raises, added 
premiums for employees’ insurance, increased pension contributions, 
and escalation in rents for its office spaces.85 Whenever such upticks are 
beyond the control of agency budgets at a time that appropriations 
remain flat—especially if the agency carries out its mission using human 
employees more than hardware—Congress has in effect diminished its 
spending on regulation.86 
An alternative metric would focus on whether a level of funding 
suffices to fulfill the statutory agenda. This conclusion may appear 
beyond the judicial ken, replete as it is with tradeoffs and indeterminate 
variables piled on top of the question of what the statute seeks to achieve. 
Courts are familiar with it, however, having issued numerous judgments 
in response to contentions that the federal government lacks the money 
to pay a claim or cannot afford to fund entitlements.87 
For judges who resist accepting implied reverse preemption in 
the belief that it is too novel or too potentially far-reaching, one last 
metric could limit the doctrine to extraordinary circumstances. A court 
could choose to find implied reverse preemption only when the relevant 
agency appears unfunded to the point of utter dysfunction: a de facto 
abolition of the entity.88 This conservative approach to implied reverse 
preemption is at odds with the ready inference of preemption to 
immunize tort defendants, a locus of what might be called judicial 
  
 84 Courts could refine this analysis with attention to circumstances as they arise. For 
example, a domestic spending freeze might dictate a reduction in dollar appropriations throughout 
the federal bureaucracy. Such a reduction does not express retreat from the particular regulatory 
mandate. Another possible metric that attends to circumstances would consider relative decline in 
spending. Similarly situated agencies or entities might have received more money while the agency 
in question is receiving less. Courts may infer that this shift in expenditure manifests a reduced 
desire to affect the statute’s design. Relative decline, like the absolute decline mentioned above, 
would require data from a period of years to show the diminution in congressional interest, as well as 
an understanding of the relevant comparators. 
 85 Telephone Interview with Rachel Weintraub, Dir. of Prod. Safety and Senior Counsel, 
Consumer Fed. of Am. (Dec. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Weintraub Interview]. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. A state-law analogy emerges in education 
cases. When local governments contend that they cannot afford to honor state constitutional rights to 
education, courts often insist that they must. See generally Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is 
Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 EMORY L.J. 1613, 1620-
23 (2007) (describing judges’ willingness to enforce rights by ordering expenditures). 
 88 I have in mind a collapse in funding that in turn generates consensus that the agency 
has fallen to the level of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) following 
Hurricane Katrina. See Clif Chitwood, Study Risk of Quake Before Adopting Codes, ARK. 
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 2008 (available on LEXIS) (“In FEMA’s world view, hurricanes, 
floods, tornadoes, earthquakes and any other event that might cost the federal government money are 
all of one kind and demand the same response: more money spent by others in the form of unfunded 
mandates”); Carol Eisenberg, FEMA Falls Short on L.I., NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Dec. 14, 2007, at A30 
(referring to “the Katrina debacle”). 
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activism;89 but it offers courts a principled basis to reject implied reverse 
preemption for the common run of cases while having it available 
whenever dire appropriation levels support the inference. 
2. Manifested Regulatory Design in Retreat: Later Amendments  
Courts can find implied reverse preemption manifested in 
decisions by Congress to pull back from its earlier safety mandates. We 
have already noted the possibility of repeal, the plainest signal of 
congressional retreat from an agenda.90  Less overt, but just as probative 
of abandonment, is a pattern of amendments that weaken the original 
swath of regulatory powers. 
The inference gains strength the more numerous such weakening 
amendments become. A single piece of amending legislation that appears 
to express withdrawal from a preempting scheme, if ambiguous, ought to 
receive the benefit of the doubt: it could look like relinquishment but 
might amount to a different approach to the same safety agenda that had 
been, and remains, incompatible with tort liability. After the withdrawing 
amendments accrete, however, they express in the aggregate a 
congressional intent to do less to maintain the original safety-enhancing 
federal regime.  
B. Agency Abandonment  
Judicial inquiries into implied preemption, a construct rooted in 
legislative supremacy and, from there, in congressional intent, also 
consider the policies that an agency has manifested, distinct from the 
statutory provisions that empower it.91 As constitutional actors, agencies 
respond to the direction of Congress. Courts call this direction 
delegation.92 Like preemption itself, delegation is a judicial construct that 
need not―and typically will not―be manifested in overt action by 
Congress.93  
  
 89 The writings of Mary Davis are on point. See generally Mary J. Davis, The Supreme 
Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075 (1996) (summarizing the 
Supreme Court’s energetic embrace of doctrines to protect products liability defendants); Davis, 
Unmasking, supra note 40. 
 90 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 91 See generally Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25; see also Ausness, supra 
note 21, at 758-71 (noting the complications of deferring to an agency position that has shifted over 
time).  
 92 Derived from Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 843-44 (1984), this delegation compels courts to recognize the authority of agency-set policy. 
On these relations in tripartite-government terms, see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and 
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989). 
 93 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66. 
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1. Authority: Recognizing Delegation to Make a Decision 
About Reversing a Regulatory Direction 
Every federal agency brings its own expertise and methods to a 
legislative agenda. Under the version of congressional intent that courts 
use to hold that a plaintiff may not proceed with a personal injury claim, 
courts infer that Congress, instead of (or in addition to) writing safety 
regulations of its own, gave an administrative authority the power to craft 
rules superior to those that would emerge from state decisional law. The 
competence that makes delegation plausible in a particular context 
necessarily includes a distinct identity. 
Accompanying this premise, so central to implied preemption, is 
the mirror-premise central to implied reverse preemption: An agency that 
once was inclined to codify and enforce safety regulations can become 
disinclined to stick to this task.94 Inertia keeps old rules in the Code of 
Federal Regulations and other repositories long after individuals who 
effect agency policy have ceased to care about particular regulatory goals 
that the agency used to pursue. So seen, delegation represents a 
congressional grant of power that assigns an agency not only the 
prerogative to write rules potent enough to preempt tort liability, but also 
the prerogative to let go of its erstwhile preemptive ambition.95  
Any judge who reaches a conclusion of abandonment by an 
agency does not necessarily condemn this inaction. Agency restraint 
might bespeak a “no harm, no foul” conclusion about an industry or 
sector that has been functioning well, independent of or unaffected by the 
federal code. Alternatively, a problematic condition―sloth, corruption, 
capture by industry, or inadequate funding from Congress―might 
explain the torpor of a do-little agency.  
Judges’ power to find implied reverse preemption has effects 
that are benign when the industry is functioning well and salutary when it 
needs intervention. If an agency has declined to write rules because the 
sector it regulates is not hurting anyone, then personal injury litigation 
will not clog the courts,96 and no harm to the congressional design will 
  
 94 Cf. OWEN, supra note 21, at 954 (observing, in another context, that “even a federal 
agency has the right to change its mind, and that an agency’s current views on preemption are 
entitled to respect”). 
 95 See generally Sharkey, Institutional Approach, supra note 25 (emphasizing the role of 
agencies as safety decisionmakers). 
 96 I assume an inverse relation between the safety of the sector’s activity and the rate of 
personal injury claiming. I do not mean to suggest that every claim filed bespeaks a real injury, only 
that preemption is not the solution to fraudulent or exaggerated allegations of injury by malingerers 
and their attorneys. Preemption functions to bar claims of true harm on the premise that giving 
plaintiffs the relief they seek, or forcing sellers to proceed with manufacture and distribution in 
anticipation of being sued, would retard rather than advance public safety. See supra text 
accompanying notes 59-62 (discussing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)). Like 
all other affirmative defenses, preemption does not catch or discourage dishonest claiming. Fears of 
the falsity problem have no place in the law of preemption. When applying the doctrine, courts may 
reasonably assume that attempts to bring personal injury claims bespeak real injuries, and, 
conversely, that the lack of such attempts suggests a track record of safety. 
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follow. The existence of an industry flourishing―and hurting few 
people―with few agency-written rules and little liability provides an 
instance of success with which implied reverse preemption will not 
interfere.97 If the agency ought to have written and enforced rules but 
became inactive for malign reasons, then reversing the inference of 
preemption helps to cure a pathology. 
2. Manifestations: Scant Rulemaking Activity, Budgetary 
Passivity, and a Subdued Public Presence  
The Congressional Review Act, passed in 1996 as part of the 
famed anti-regulatory Contract With America, requires federal agencies 
to submit their proposed rules to Congress for approval.98 The statute 
declares that a proposed rule may fall into the “major” category; a major 
rule is defined as a rule expected to have an annual impact on the 
economy of at least $100 million.99 During the first decade of enactment, 
federal agencies duly conveyed to Congress and the General Accounting 
Office 41,218 non-major rules and 610 major rules,100 thereby setting a 
baseline quantity.   
The rules appear numerous, but might not be so in relation to the 
amount of regulation needed. Scant rulemaking activity―or at least an 
attitude against rulemaking―occupied federal policy before the Contract 
With America. Calls for regulatory relief emerged loudly in the Reagan 
administration:101 critics who claimed that the government was wasting 
money on irrational and inefficient rules advocated successfully within 
the executive branch for cost-benefit analysis as a policy tool. The cost-
benefit criterion compels administrators to justify proposed rules as 
tending to produce gains that exceed losses.102  
The premise behind the requirement is that administrators would 
otherwise overregulate. Advocates of regulatory rollback have argued 
that when unchecked by constraints like cost-benefit analysis, 
bureaucrats write rules more burdensome than what rational, informed 
  
 97 An example of this success from my own long-concluded experience as a litigator: I 
used to defend personal injury claims for toxic shock syndrome, a disease attributed to tampons. 
Lawyers once specialized in this category of products liability work. Today, as a result of improved 
product design and well-written FDA-mandated warnings, tampon-associated toxic shock syndrome 
arises so much less often, and the decisional law about it has become so clear, that lawyers can no 
longer make a living prosecuting or defending these claims. Judges agree that claims of defective 
warning are preempted by compliance with the FDA script, see, e.g., Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 
F.3d 737, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1997); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988-
90 (8th Cir. 1994), but because of the absence of injuries and claims, a contrary understanding of 
preemption would leave manufacturers and consumers in the same position.  
 98 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). 
 99 Id. § 804(2)(A). 
 100 Cindy Skrzycki, Reform’s Knockout Act, Kept Out of the Ring, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 
2006, at D1. 
 101 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A 
Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 446-47 (2008). 
 102 See id. at 449-50. 
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governments and individuals would choose.103 This claim, which critics 
have contested vigorously,104 may be stated in less controversial terms: 
Rule-promulgating is the core business of an agency. Administrators who 
do not occupy themselves with the creation of new rules are relatively 
inactive. 
These administrators have other activities as well. 
Accompanying the truism that “rulemakers make rules” is the 
proposition that individuals who head agencies seek to maximize their 
budgets.105 Anyone actively heading a federal agency would desire larger 
appropriations from Congress and want decisionmakers within the 
executive branch like the Office of Management and Budget to support 
the agency’s petition for more money. Finally, administrators who 
manage agencies actively will pursue public relations, understanding that 
media visibility tends to bolster taxpayer support for the mission. 
Administrators of any agency whose mission includes public safety will 
want recognition of its safety-enhancing efforts. 
Vital signs like these have their antonyms. Reduced rulemaking 
activity, budgetary passivity, and a subdued public presence all manifest 
retreat from a regulatory agenda.  Any agency that writes few or no 
major rules, or an exceptionally low number of non-major rules, is doing 
relatively little regulating. Lack of advocacy for budgetary largesse 
implies lack of participation in the regulatory endeavor. The public-
visibility aspect of agency strength, though harder to quantify than the 
other two indicators, is amenable to observation of the agency head at 
work. 
III. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY AS AN INSTANCE OF IMPLIED 
REVERSE PREEMPTION 
 
Evaluating consumer product safety in terms of implied reverse 
preemption calls for two steps of analysis. The first step, undertaken in 
the first section of this Part, looks for preemptive effects of federal 
statutes (focusing on the Consumer Product Safety Act) to show why 
readers of a statute might draw the inference of preemption and to 
explore the consequences of a retreat from preemption. The second 
section of the Part proceeds to evidence supporting an inference of 
retreat from preemption as manifested by both Congress and the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission. 
  
 103 See, e.g., id. at 448 (summarizing studies by John F. Morrall, Robert W. Hahn, and 
Tammy O. Tengs and John O. Graham). 
 104 See id. at 448-52.  
 105 See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 630 
(1975); Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 101, at 452 (noting “that agency heads seek to increase 
their budgets”). 
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A. Statutory Language Supporting an Inference of Preemption  
Congress empowered the Consumer Products Safety 
Commission to regulate under several statutes: the CPSA, the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act, the Refrigerator Safety Act, the Flammable 
Fabrics Act, and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act.106 Preemption is 
not an issue for three of the five. Because the Poison Prevention 
Packaging Act and the Refrigerator Safety Act have been invoked only 
rarely in personal injury litigation, a preemption defense has not emerged 
in decisional law.107 The Flammable Fabrics Act is settled, at least as of 
this writing, in the opposite direction: even though this statute contains a 
preemption clause, “the courts have ruled that [it] does not preempt 
products liability claims for flammable clothing.”108  
As for the Federal Hazardous Substances Act (“FHSA”), this 
statute authorizes the Commission to establish mandatory labeling 
requirements for certain chemicals marketed for household use.109 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., which in 1992 held that congressionally 
mandated words on cigarette packaging preempted tort liability,110 invites 
a similar interpretation of CPSC-decreed warning language, and so one 
might have predicted the pattern reported in the leading products liability 
hornbook: cases from the 1970s find no preemption and cases post-
Cipollone find that the FHSA does indeed preempt.111 Because the FHSA 
gives the Commission authority to script acceptable warnings, courts 
interpreting this statute after Cipollone have found the inference of 
preemption straightforward. 
Although its case law is sparse, the Consumer Product Safety 
Act presents a more varied preemption picture.112 The CPSA contains 
both express-preemption and savings clauses.113 Express preemption 
appears in the CPSA provision that no state may establish a safety 
standard or regulation about a consumer product if a federal safety 
standard issued under authority of the CPSA already addresses this risk 
  
 106 James L. Winokur & Jennifer Robbins, Consumer Product Safety: Preemption, the 
Commerce Clause and State Regulatory Authority, 25 VILL. L. REV. 232, 238-39 (1979-1980). 
 107 Looking for cases, I found none where a defendant contended that a claim was 
preempted by the Refrigerator Safety Act and, on the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, I located 
only unpublished ones that provided little doctrine: Miles v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 00 C 
3278, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22695, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2002) (holding that the plaintiff’s 
claim was preempted by “nearly identical” language in the Federal Hazardous Substances Act and 
the Poison Prevention Packing Act); Pinckney v. Zep Mfg. Co., No. 94-CV-0742, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 5172, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997) (conceding that the packaging statutes might 
preempt, but holding that they did not apply to the product in question). 
 108 OWEN, supra note 21, at 966 n.215. 
 109 Id. at 967. 
 110 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992). 
 111 Compare OWEN, supra note 21, at 967 & n.225, with id. at 967 & n.226. 
 112 See Davis, Unmasking, supra note 40, at 1028 (noting judicial confusion on this 
question). 
 113 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting that several federal statutes combine 
the two clauses). 
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of injury.114 Two savings clauses are also present in the statute. One 
clause saves remedies available under state law for violation of CPSA 
provisions.115 The second, more familiar, savings clause provides that 
compliance with federal consumer safety rules will not relieve a seller 
from liability at common law.116  
Since 2000, federal courts have used Geier v. American Honda 
Co., Inc.117 for guidance in navigating the inclusion of these apparently 
contradictory preemption messages. Although Geier ruled in favor of a 
seller-defendant, the opinion of the Court insisted that the presence of a 
savings clause in a statute mandates a narrow reading of preemption 
language: a broad reading would mean that “little, if any, potential 
‘liability at common law’ would remain. And few, if any, tort actions 
would remain for the savings clause to save.”118 Thus, despite the failure 
of the plaintiff’s personal injury claim in Geier, consumer-safety 
decisions that cite Geier agree that the multiple clauses of the CPSA 
must preserve at least some tort liability.119 
Framing the CPSA preemption question in terms of Geier means 
that courts must scrutinize the particulars of the plaintiff’s claim, which 
typically will allege a warning or design defect. If the remedy sought 
does not conflict with a regulation promulgated under the statute, then 
the claim is not preempted, and the plaintiff may seek redress in tort. If 
what the plaintiff seeks is at odds with federal consumer safety 
regulations, then the CPSA preempts the claim. 
Courts applying the CPSA to particular complaints have reached 
different conclusions on preemption. Most of what might be called the 
lawnmower cases have concluded that the CPSA preempts claims of 
design defect and failure to warn.120 The other product-specific set of 
cases, attributing harm to cigarette lighters, has produced more mixed 
results.121 Presenting no unanimity on the question of preemption, in sum, 
  
 114 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (2006). 
 115 Id. § 2075(b). 
 116 Id. § 2074(a). 
 117 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 118 Id. at 868. 
 119 See, e.g., Summerlin v. Scott Petroleum Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 (S.D. Miss. 
2004) (refusing federal jurisdiction because the CPSA had insufficient preemptive effect); Churchill 
Village, LLC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Colon v. BIC USA, 
Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 196, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that permitting tort liability would not 
obstruct federal regulation); see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63-64 (2002) 
(holding that under this reading of the two clauses in a boat safety statute, plaintiff’s claim was not 
preempted). The legislative history of the CPSA is consistent with this inclination to preserve state 
liability. Robert B Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of 
Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 741 & n.251 (1997). 
 120 See Moe v. MTD Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that warning 
claims but not design claims were preempted); Frazier v. Heckingers, 96 F. Supp. 2d 486, 491 (E.D. 
Pa. 2000) (holding that the CPSA preempts both design and warning claims); Cortez v. MTD Prods., 
Inc., 927 F. Supp. 386, 389 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
 121 Compare Hittle v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 (M.D. Pa. 2001) 
(finding no preemption), and Colon, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (same), with Ball v. BIC Corp., No. 
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decisional law does feature several judicial conclusions that the 
Consumer Product Safety Act, coupled with actions taken by the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, can bar injured persons from 
bringing claims against product sellers.  
B. Manifestations of a Lesser Federal Regulatory Interest 
1. Amendments Marching Backward  
Staffers at the Consumer Product Safety Commission recently 
prepared a list of amendments to the Consumer Product Safety Act 
enacted through 2008, in the form of an unofficial compilation.122 Of the 
ten pieces of legislation named, two pertain directly to implied reverse 
preemption: the 1981 amendments are most central, but amendments of 
1976 are of interest as well.123 To show the arc of withdrawal, I review 
the 1976 and 1981 changes in chronological order. 
The Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act 
of 1976 achieved its “improvements” prominently by removing 
Commission authority to regulate tobacco and firearms.124 As early as 
1973 it had been clear enough to then-professor Antonin Scalia and his 
co-author Frank Goodman that the Act did not give the Commission any 
power with respect to these two products,125 but the 1976 amendment 
took the form of an overt ban on CPSC authority.126 An anti-regulatory 
sentiment is manifest throughout the 1976 amendments, which widened 
the swath of preemptable state law: the original CPSA had encouraged 
uniformity via its express preemption clause but allowed state consumer 
regulation to differ from CPSC-authorized rules whenever the CPSC 
approved these state alternatives as amenable to co-existence. The 1976 
amendments ordered the CPSC to deem such state regulations 
  
4:97-CV-02467, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19699, at *7-8 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2000) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s design claims were preempted, and that the warning claim failed for other reasons), and 
Frith v. BIC Corp., 863 So. 2d 960, 967 (Miss. 2004) (holding that design defect claim was 
preempted because the CPSC had issued cigarette lighter regulations that did not require the safety 
feature at issue), and BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter, 251 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. 2008) (same).  
 122 See Safety Matters and Other Thoughts, http://blog.wemakeitsafer.com (Nov. 9, 2008). 
The list mentions the Consumer Product Safety Commissions Improvement Act of 1976, the 
Emergency Interim Consumer Product Safety Act Authorization Act of 1978, the Consumer Product 
Safety Amendments of 1981, the Orphan Drug Act, the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988, 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act of 1990, the 
Child Safety Protect Act, and the 2008 Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act, with which this 
Article began. Id. 
 123 Six of the others, being narrower or more modest in scope, do not bear on the question 
of retreat; the Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act of 1990 focuses mainly on reporting 
obligations and does not relate directly to tort liability; the 2008 Act is written as a congressional 
volte-face. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text. 
 124 Pub. L. No. 94-284, §§ 3(c), (e), 90 Stat. 503, 504 (1976). 
 125 Scalia & Goodman, supra note 13, at 902. 
 126 See Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, A Public Heath Approach to Regulating 
Firearms as Consumer Products, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (2000) (noting that firearms and 
ammunition are largely exempted from all safety regulation, not just CPSC rulemaking). 
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inconsistent when manufacturers’ economic difficulties with compliance 
were included in the “burden” these state regulations created.127  
The maneuvers of 1976 show the need for a doctrine of implied 
reverse preemption. Implied reverse preemption perceives the difference 
between, on the one hand, a national scheme of safety regulation, which 
tort liability might obstruct and thereby harm public welfare and, on the 
other hand, an unprincipled gift of immunity to the injuring sector, which 
tort liability might also obstruct and thereby enhance public welfare. 
Mere enactments do not of themselves evince congressional occupation 
of a field or comprehensive regulation. As a judge can easily tell, the 
1976 amendments did nothing to make consumer products safer. They 
took away from the CPSC regulatory authority over two products 
without giving this power to any other federal agency, and they 
squelched safety-fostering rules that states could otherwise have 
promulgated by adding an anti-safety economic-burden element to what 
the CPSC had to weigh when reviewing state regulations. Putting too 
much faith in the surface of the 1976 amendments―Look! The 
amendments extend federal control. Congress must have intended to 
preempt!―yields a wrong answer to the intent question. Implied reverse 
preemption, with its criteria for showing abandonment, repairs the error. 
The Reagan-vintage 1981 amendments occupy the peak of 
congressional withdrawal from consumer product safety regulation. 
Declaring that the CPSC must do less and exercise less power, they 
display the retreat that is central to implied reverse preemption. Congress 
provided in 1981 that the CPSC could no longer write “requirements 
governing the contents, composition, design, construction, finish, or 
packaging of products.”128  Instead, it had to limit its standards to the 
domain of “performance, labeling, and warning.”129 Congress also 
prevented the Commission from releasing reports that manufacturers had 
provided about product hazards, removed amusement park rides from 
CPSC jurisdiction, and established a panel that had to be convened 
before the Commission could begin rulemaking about toxins.130   
More notoriously, in the 1981 amendments Congress prohibited 
the Commission from promulgating mandatory rules. “Voluntary” 
standards became the regulatory mode of choice.131 Under this reform, 
rather than write a mandate, the Commission must publish an advance 
notice of proposed rulemaking and invite the submission of an existing 
  
 127 15 U.S.C. § 2075(c). This manufacturer-protective view of interstate commerce 
diverged from Supreme Court case law that had prevailed. Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative 
Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1438 & n.44 (1984). 
 128 Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” The Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1426 (1992). 
 129 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130 Adler, supra note 16, at 98 n.204. 
 131 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 70. 
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voluntary standard or the intent to draft one.132 Only when no adequate 
voluntary standard emerges or when industry fails to comply with 
voluntary standards may the Commission resort to a mandatory rule.133  
The legislative history of the 1972 statute had expressed scorn 
for voluntary standards as a source of consumer safety.134 According to 
the 1970 report that Congress commissioned, any voluntary standard that 
originated in an industry’s “consensus” about what would be good 
typically will amount to “little more than an affirmation of the status 
quo.”135 An earlier report by the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, also included in the legislative history, viewed mandatory 
safety standards as necessary to eliminating as much as twenty percent of 
household accidents.136 When it was young, the Commission habitually 
“expressed strong reservations about voluntary standards.”137  
It would be naïve to celebrate mandatory standards as desirable 
per se; they have had a problematic record in American consumer 
product safety. Writing in 1973 about the Commission’s administrative 
procedures, Scalia and Goodman described the extraordinarily 
cumbersome routes to mandatory rules that Congress had imposed on the 
fledgling agency.138 One especially burdensome process—a road 
probably paved with good intentions—banned the CPSC from writing its 
own mandatory standards; instead it had to receive petitions from the 
public (individual citizens, regulated industries, and dilettantes alike) that 
contained draft standards for its review.139 This “offeror” method of 
rulewriting, now gone, had the effect of compelling the Commission to 
dance to outsiders’ tunes, causing its second chairman, S. John Byington, 
to install new rules that streamlined the bulky procedures at the price of 
shifting more work onto petitioners.140 Thus, by the time Congress 
rejected mandatory standards in 1981, the CPSC had had negative 
experiences with such rules.  
  
 132 15 U.S.C. § 2058(a)(5)-(6) (2006). Once it receives such a submission, the 
Commission is charged to assist in the development of voluntary standards. Id. § 2054(a)(3)-(4). 
 133 Id. § 2058(b)(2). 
 134 See Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development 
of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1399-1400 
(1978). 
 135 Id. at 1400 (quoting the NAT’L COMM’N ON PROD. SAFETY, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY 62 (1970)). 
 136 BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT: TEXT, 
ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 2 (1973). 
 137 Adler, supra note 16, at 94. 
 138 See Scalia & Goodman, supra note 13, at 908. 
 139 Carl Tobias, Early Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Federal Administrative Agency 
Context: Experimentation with the Offeror Process at the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 44 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 411-12 (1987). 
 140 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 52-54. Streamlining reduced the Commission’s backlog 
but failed to quell constituent discontent. Congress responded by modifying the offeror procedure in 
1978 and eliminating it in 1981. Tobias, supra note 139, at 412-13.  
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Arguably, then, the mandatory-to-voluntary shift could manifest 
mindfulness―a carefully chosen regulatory policy―rather than 
pathology. As one lawyer who advocates for manufacturers before the 
Commission recently argued, any agency with jurisdiction over many 
varied products will function more flexibly using voluntary industry 
standards, other things being equal.141 Proposed new federal rules, the 
only alternative type of administrative regulation, must clear 
“cumbersome notice-and-comment requirements.”142 A plenary mandate 
means that the Commission can have little comparative advantage as a 
writer of new product-specific regulations and thus can delegate 
rulemaking effectively to industry evaluations.143 Under this approach, 
the Commission abstains conscientiously from the writing of standards 
(rather than fails to write them) and intervenes primarily through its 
power to find a “substantial product hazard” warranting a recall order.144  
To conclude that this mode of regulation supports a finding of 
implied reverse preemption is not to criticize the decisionmakers who 
choose it, nor the merits of any scheme that rests on voluntary standards. 
Undoubtedly both regulated sectors and Commission regulators could 
deploy the voluntary-standards method in good faith and with due regard 
for consumer welfare. The question for courts considering implied 
preemption, however, is not whether regulators are doing a bad job but 
whether the behavior of an agency bespeaks a retreat from overt 
intervention that had once been sufficient to indicate the occupying of a 
field or the imposition of a regulatory design incompatible with tort 
liability.145 Laissez-faire execution of a statutory mandate, whatever 
virtues it may offer, does not comport with field preemption or conflict 
preemption. Instead it manifests a plan to refrain from telling the 
regulated sector what to do. When such a plan is in place, tort liability 
fills the regulatory void, and to the extent it tells a manufacturer what to 
do, it defies no contrary orders from an agency or Congress. Taken as a 
whole, the Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981 identify 
federal regulation—rather than danger to consumers—as an ill to be 
eradicated. Tort liability becomes necessary whenever federal regulation 
is cast as problematic. 
This necessity remains even when regulators praise the 
effectiveness of voluntary controls. In a 1995 report, the Commission 
claimed to have enjoyed “great success in working cooperatively with 
  
 141 See John B. O’Loughlin, Jr., Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act: Not the Last 
Word on Preemption, Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA), at 1037 (Oct. 20, 2008).  
 142 Id. 
 143 See id. 
 144 Id. (citing Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 
§ 218(c), 122 Stat. 3016, 3061 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (2008)). 
 145 See Wilson v. Bradlees of New Eng., Inc., 96 F.3d 552, 557 (1st Cir. 1996) (observing 
that “[f]ederal regulation may be a substitute for common-law liability; industry self-regulation is 
not”). 
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industry to develop voluntary standards.”146  No better route to consumer 
safety, it asserted: “Indeed, the Commission has found that with the 
products it regulates, negotiating such standards can be far more efficient 
than rulemaking or even negotiated rulemaking.”147 Perhaps. This Article 
has no ideological quarrel with standards that industries write to govern 
themselves; such precepts might function better than mandatory rules.148  
Used to suppress personal injury claiming, however, voluntary 
standards obstruct the entitlements of all who did not consent to them 
and could otherwise bring tort actions. In function these standards 
become just as mandatory as they are voluntary. Courts cannot escape 
the inference of compulsion; faced with preemption disputes in the 
context of consumer safety, they can weigh in on the “mandatory” 
question only by determining who will be compelled, manufacturers or 
the persons alleging injury from defective products. The libertarian 1981 
amendments are coercive indeed without a doctrine of implied reverse 
preemption to ameliorate what they compel.  
2. Defunding 
By whatever metric a court might apply—absolute defunding, 
relative defunding, funding insufficient to meet the agency’s statutory 
mandate, perhaps even defunding to the point of dysfunction—
appropriations to support the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
were too low to sustain an inference of preemption for the period 1981 to 
2008. Though less dramatic than the statutory retreat of 1981, the 
appropriation pattern of that same year lends further support to an 
inference of reverse preemption. Fiscal year 1982 manifested a shrunken 
budget for the CPSC: the Commission had to close offices and retrench 
its operations.149 The ideology ascendant in the early 1980s—
deregulation coupled with tax cuts to “starve the beast”150—helped to 
impose a view that one writer has described, with a straight face, as “Let 
the Market Protect Consumer Safety.”151  
  
 146  U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, REGULATORY REFORM INITIATIVE—
SUMMARY REPORT (June 1995), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/8005.html.  
 147 Id. 
 148 In the context of pharmaceuticals, I have argued for a regulatory shift that would favor 
transparency, incentives for the industry, and information production over traditional command-
based restraints. See generally Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription for 
Drug Regulation, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 569 (2006). 
 149 Eliot Klayman, Comment, Standard Setting Under the Consumer Product Safety 
Amendments of 1981—A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 96, 98 & n.15 
(1982). 
 150 For a summary of this ideology as put into effect in 1981, see Jon Margolis, Reagan 
Revolution Stronger Now than During Presidency, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 2004, at Cl. 
 151 Hood, supra note 19. 
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Commission funding never regained the level of the benchmark 
year 1974.152 In 1997, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) studied 
the appropriation of money to the CPSC and how the agency used these 
funds.153 During that year, the CPSC budget was $42.5 million, and the 
agency employed 480 full-time equivalents.154 The GAO calculated that 
these numbers represented a 60% drop in funding (adjusting for 
inflation) and a 43% cut in the staff compared to 1974.155 The 
Commission had noted with pride in 1994 that it had the same budget 
(unadjusted) that it had in 1979.156  
Flat levels of appropriation and staffing for the CPSC represent a 
retreat from regulation because “since 1974, many of the industries the 
CPSC regulates have experienced explosive growth.”157 Injury rates too 
have increased: for example, “toy-related injuries [went] from about 
130,000 in 1996 to about 220,000 in 2006,” a rise that exceeds the 
concomitant growth in population.158 Similarly, the rise in deaths 
associated with all-terrain vehicles, “from 55 in 1985 to 734 in 2004,” far 
exceeds their rise in sales.159 
Reductions in federal budgets result from a combination of 
lessened inclination among legislators to appropriate money and lessened 
agency requests. Negotiations among the CPSC, the Office of 
Management and Budget, and congressional committees yield each 
annual appropriation.160 Courts attuned to the negotiation dynamic can 
conclude that reduced appropriation for an agency may bespeak not only 
congressional retreat but an agency’s disinclination to spend money on 
regulation. Observed through this lens, the CPSC at least cooperated 
with, and may have hastened, the decline in congressional funding that 
supports an inference of reverse preemption. 
  
 152 “From FY 1974, when the agency first became fully operational, to FY 2008, CPSC’s 
budget has been cut almost 40 percent when adjusted for inflation.” OMB Watch, Product Safety 
Regulator Hobbled by Decades of Negligence, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/ 
articleview/4154/1/527 [hereinafter OMB Watch]. 
 153 FELCHER, supra note 36, at 195. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, available 
at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/pubs/reports/114.html. 
 157 FELCHER, supra note 36, at 195. Sectors that have burgeoned since the 1970s include 
home improvement equipment (marketed through the Home Depot chain, which grew enormous 
over those years), recreational equipment like snowmobiles and scooters, and items used to transport 
small children. Id.  
 158 OMB Watch, supra note 152.  
 159 Id.; see also Robin Ingle, Which Toys are Okay? Don’t Ask the Safety Police, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 24, 2007, at B3 (observing, from an inside-the-agency perspective, that by 2004 
“[d]eaths and injuries [from all-terrain vehicles] had grown to such alarming numbers that my 
supervisor [at CPSC], a meticulous statistician, asked me to recalculate them several times”). 
 160 Weintraub interview, supra note 85. 
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3. Almost No Strong Rules 
We have seen that two adjectives modify the word “standards” 
or “rules” to connote heft: “mandatory” and “major.”161 Rules in the 
mandatory category indicate that the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission deems the danger too strong for rulemaking by industry 
consensus. Rules in the major category have a significant effect on the 
economy. Both adjectives are vanishingly rare in the annals of consumer 
safety rulemaking from 1981 to 2009. 
When the Consumer Product Safety Commission was formed, its 
first chairman, Richard Simpson, predicted that the Commission would 
promulgate about a hundred mandatory standards during its early 
years.162 Commissioner Simpson was off by a factor of about a 
hundred.163 Agency frustration with the mandatory-standard approach can 
account for only part of this slender record.164 
Over its entire history, the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission has written only one rule that falls into the “major” 
category: a rule on mattress flammability promulgated in 2006.165 Given 
the wide jurisdiction of the agency―”consumer product” describes many 
things, even after retrenchments from the original statutory 
language166―it is hard to suppose that no other hazard belongs in the 
$150 million category. An output this slender shows a disinclination to 
write important rules. 
4. Lassitude in Leadership  
Torpor at the Consumer Product Safety Commission before the 
2008 amendments exudes from the public behaviors of commissioners 
and those who appointed them. The two years preceding the 2008 
legislation are particularly salient: in this period the Bush administration 
manifested its lack of interest in robust regulation of consumer safety. 
When the chairman of the CPSC, Hal Stratton, left the agency in 2006 to 
join “a law firm that specialize[d] in attacking class-action lawsuits filed 
by consumers,”167 the President did not appoint anyone to replace him, 
  
 161 See supra text accompanying notes 131-133 (noting the exceptional status of 
mandatory rules in contemporary CPSC rulemaking); text accompanying notes 99-102 (describing 
major rules as classified in the Congressional Review Act).  
 162 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 44.  
 163 FELCHER, supra note 36, at 29-30 (noting that by 1977 the Commission “had issued 
only three mandatory standards”).  
 164 See id.; see also supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text. 
 165 See infra notes 178-186 (discussing this rule). 
 166 See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 42-43 (noting “expansive jurisdiction” of the statute 
and reporting estimates that the CPSC regulates about “ten thousand consumer products and over a 
million producers and sellers of such products”).  
 167 David Lazarus, Trouble at the Top for Safety Agency, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at C1. 
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and left office without having named a chairman.168 Starting in January 
2008, until a stopgap in August 2008 was set up to run for the remainder 
of the calendar year, the CPSC lacked a quorum of commissioners and 
was thus precluded from doing much of its work. President Bush 
nominated an employee of the National Association of Manufacturers to 
one of the Commission’s vacant seats; this nominee withdrew two 
months later when members of the Senate insisted on seeing his 
severance agreement from this defense-side lobby.169 
This void at the Commission is sufficient of itself to evince an 
absence of field preemption or conflict preemption—that is, emptiness 
signifies inaction—and the public behaviors of its chairman during this 
period confirm the inference. It bears mention that regulators working in 
an era suspicious of regulation are under pressure not to look like 
zealots.170 That said, a CPSC commissioner can stick out as especially 
disinclined to regulate.  
The CPSC chairman holding office at the time of this writing 
embodies such disinclination. Back in 2007, when Congress began to 
plan its increased appropriations for consumer safety, Nancy Nord 
declared she did not want what a news story at the time called “more 
money and more power.”171 A Senate panel had proposed to increase the 
agency’s budget from $63 million to nearly $142 million in 2015 and 
raise its cap on penalties from $1.8 million to $100 million.172 The 
commissioner “said thanks but no thanks to the Senate’s offer.”173 She 
wrote two letters to members of the Senate Commerce Committee, 
asking them “not to approve the bulk of legislation that would increase 
the agency’s authority, double its budget and sharply increase its 
dwindling staff.”174  
  
 168 See William M. Welch, Lead Law Throttles Youth Powersports, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 
2009, at 3A (reporting information announced to the media by the chief of staff to the acting 
chairman). In May 2009, when this Article was going to press, President Barak Obama named Inez 
Moore Tenenbaum as chairman and Robert S. Adler, a scholar of product safety regulation, as 
commissioner. Andrew Zajac, Head of Product Safety Is Named, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 2009, at B4; 
see also supra note 16 (citing Adler’s work on the CPSC).  
 169 David Lazarus, Consumer Advocates Hope Watchdog Agencies Get More Bite, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at C1; see also Kevin G. Hall, Government Regulation of Business May 
Increase, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Jan. 11, 2009, at A3. 
 170 One chairman appointed by President Clinton and remembered as a consumer activist, 
Ann Brown, mentioned early in her tenure that “being an advocate and being a regulator are very 
different, and they should be. I have to bring all the disparate interests together. I can’t just be 
advocating for any one group.” Julie Gannon Shoop, The New, Improved CPSC: Under Ann Brown, 
A Consumer Protection Revival, TRIAL, Sept. 1, 1994, at 22 (reporting an interview with Brown). 
 171 Lazarus, supra note 167.  
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Stephen Labaton, Bigger Budget? No, Responds Safety Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 
2007; see also id. (noting that the Commission had only one employee to test toys and only 15 
inspectors handling imported consumer products, “a marketplace that last year was valued at $614 
billion”). 
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The acting chairman made artful arguments against the proffered 
largesse. She did not say that she found the prospect of actually 
regulating anyone to be repugnant. Instead she spoke about agency 
expertise and unintended consequences. The whistleblower protection 
provision would, she protested, give the CPSC a “dramatic and 
unprecedented mission.”175 The proposed increase in penalties would 
motivate manufactures to blanket the CPSC with self-protective 
documentation. Both new powers—apparently, any new powers—could 
have the perverse effect of “hampering, rather than furthering consumer 
product safety,” she said.176 She also protested the absence of immediate 
appropriations to fund the expanded mandates, even though Congress 
always mandates first and funds second.177 
Similar resistance to overt regulatory effort—if not out-and-out 
bad faith—emerges from the Commission’s long-awaited 2006 standard 
for mattress flammability.178 Here the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission practiced preemption by preamble, a measure that Congress 
banned two years later.179 One commentator describes the wording of this 
preemption statement as “expansive.”180 It was more than expansive; it 
was something of an ambush. In January 2005, the CPSC issued a far 
blander preamble in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.181 Both the 
January 2005 and the March 2006 notices in the Federal Register discuss 
preemption, as federal agencies must when they announce purposed new 
regulation;182 but whereas the 2005 notice purported only to summarize 
the existing effect of rules and standards created pursuant to the 
Flammable Fabrics Act,183 in 2006 the Commission wrote that it “intends 
and expects that the new mattress flammability standard will preempt 
inconsistent state standards and requirements.”184 It included “common 
law” as a source of such inconsistent input from the states,185 and 
deplored the possibility that “each state could use its tort law to enforce 
whatever flammability standard it deemed appropriate, potentially 
creating fifty different mattress fire standards across the nation.”186  
  
 175 Stephen J. Hedges, Toy Recalls Spur Call for Ouster, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 2007, at Cl. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Lazarus, supra note 167.  
 178 Standard for the Flammability (Open Flame) of Mattress Sets, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472 
(Mar. 15, 2006). On the status of this regulation as the CPSC’s first and only major rule, see Press 
Release CPSC, CPSC Approves New Flammability Standard for Mattresses, Feb. 16, 2006; 
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml06/06091.html. The agency has not released a count of 
its non-major regulations.  
 179 See infra note 190-192 and accompanying text. 
 180 O’Loughlin, supra note 141, at 1038.  
 181 See 70 Fed. Reg. 2,469 (Jan. 13, 2005). For discussion of this change, see O’Loughlin, 
supra note 141, at n.12. 
 182 Exec. Order No. 12,988, 61 C.F.R. 4729 (1996). 
 183 71 Fed. Reg. 2,470, 2,492-93 (Jan. 13, 2005). 
 184 71 Fed. Reg. 13,472, 13,496 (Mar. 15, 2006). 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. at 13,497. 
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The 2008 amendments to the statute articulated a clear position 
on preemption-by-preamble that suggests 2008 was indeed a turning 
point.187 Under Section 231 of the Consumer Product Safety 
Improvement Act, the Commission and all other administrative units of 
the federal government writing rules pursuant to the CPSA, the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act, and the Flammable Fabrics Act may not 
practice “preemption by preamble.”188 Congress drew up a 
comprehensive list—“any preamble, statement of policy, executive 
branch statements, or other matter associated with the publication” of a 
rule—of administrators’ devices that have been misused to declare a 
preemptive effect.189 The statement amounts to an “admonishment from 
Congress.”190 Implicitly it recognizes the dangers of preemption-by-
preamble assertion. By repudiating this technique, Congress expressed its 
skepticism about the value of preempting tort claims. The statutory 
prohibition directs courts to infer preemption more parsimoniously post-
2008 than did the courts willing to cede preemption-power to agency 
statements. 
Observers investigating the CPSC for signs of withdrawal from 
regulation might also consider the informed impressions of a recently 
departed employee who left the agency saddened (rather than, as she 
noted, “disgruntled”).191 One year before the 2008 volte-face, a former 
statistician for the CPSC published an editorial in the Washington Post 
claiming that the agency had “lost the will to perform the function it was 
created for.”192 To say that an entity has lost the will for something is 
hard to document: the writer, Robin Ingle, met the challenge with a 
couple of telling anecdotes from the office. In 2004, after Ingle 
documented an astounding rise in all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) deaths, the 
general counsel of the agency, who happened to have been a former 
lawyer for the industry, first tried (unsuccessfully) to get two CPSC 
statisticians to modify the presentation of data and then declined to 
release the report for three months. According to Ingle, CPSC employees 
circa 2007 labor inside “a defeatist anti-regulation atmosphere,” where 
no matter which product one worked on—ATVs, portable heating 
generators, hydroxides that poison children—individual efforts were 
impeded by industry resistance to rulemaking and even basic research on 
safety.193 
  
 187 See supra note 1.  
 188 See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and 
the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). 
 189 Pub. L. No. 110-314, § 231, 122 Stat. 3070 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2501 
(2008)). 
 190 O’Loughlin, supra note 141, at 1038-39. 
 191 Ingle, supra note 159. 
 192 Id.  
 193 Id. 
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CONCLUSION  
The doctrine of preemption as applied in federal courts contains 
a troubling asymmetry: Courts regularly infer that Congress intended to 
forestall tort liability, but have not been willing to infer that Congress, 
later on, abandoned this old intent. A longstanding tradition in accident 
law encourages judges (and juries) to examine circumstantial evidence in 
order to draw plausible conclusions.194 Consumer safety offers an 
illustration of what courts should be inferring: Strong circumstantial 
evidence supports the inference that no later than 1981, Congress and the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission jointly weakened federal 
consumer safety law. During a period of years that may have ended in 
2008,195 any inference that the 1973 statute preempted tort liability—the 
only other law-based source of consumer safety—became no longer 
tenable. 
I conclude with two anxieties about, and one extension of, the 
thesis of this Article.  
Anxieties first. The Consumer Product Safety Act and Consumer 
Product Safety Commission present a strong illustration of implied 
reverse preemption—perhaps too strong, in that it may set the bar too 
high. Should courts come to see CPSA-levels of retreat as necessary to 
reverse a preexisting inference that had precluded state tort liability, 
several difficulties ensue. Parties and their lawyers will forfeit certainty 
about the presence of implied reverse preemption vel non. Judges will 
share in this uncertainty. Perhaps worse, it will become relatively easy 
for both members of Congress and agency administrators who want to 
foreclose tort liability to feign stronger commitments to federal 
regulation than they really hold. Recall the announcements by the acting 
chairman of the CPSC that Congress should decline to appropriate the 
money and power it had offered the agency.196 This individual, Nancy 
Nord, disclaimed her regulatory power transparently. Fearing implied 
reverse preemption, a savvier successor-bureaucrat could probably come 
up with a more convincing gesture toward real regulation while 
stymieing the agency’s mission as laid out in the statute. Other criteria 
proposed here are vulnerable to the same tactic.197 Congress has also 
feigned regulatory vigor. Courts inferring a retreat from preemption must 
proceed forewarned that the paradigm explored in this Article presents an 
instance of the phenomenon, rather than a set of tests and hurdles. What 
  
 194 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 372 (2000) (explaining that although res ipsa 
loquitur is a form of circumstantial evidence, negligence law is replete with other circumstantial 
inferences). 
 195 See supra note 20 (expressing uncertainty about whether 2008 marks a distinct end).  
 196 Asked to name a power that her agency had and that she actually wanted, 
Commissioner Nord named only an obscure one, the prerogative to seize assets of companies 
convicted of crimes. Hedges, supra note 175. 
 197 See supra note 127 and accompanying text (summarizing the 1976 amendments to the 
CPSA, which appear busy but retreat from regulation). 
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Congress circa 1981-2008 and the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission manifested is sufficiency rather than necessity.  
Another peril presented in implied reverse preemption that could 
diminish safety is what the philosopher Albert Hirschman called 
“perversity” and “jeopardy”198—here the possibility that this reform 
would extinguish more tort liability than it can preserve. Implied reverse 
preemption protects or revives personal injury claims that defendants 
could otherwise get dismissed as preempted. Fairness as parity between 
injured persons and product sellers suggests that sellers should lose 
access to shelter that only they now enjoy. In principle, implied reverse 
preemption puts plaintiffs and defendants on a level playing field, where 
each can benefit or suffer from judicial inferring. But just as a Congress 
desirous of reducing tort liability can feign regulation by appearing to 
empower an agency, it can also use the federal commerce power to 
abrogate state regulation altogether199—and thereby extinguish tort 
liability, if courts agree that tort liability remains a form of state 
regulation. Congress has already eliminated whole categories of products 
liability from the reach of state courts.200 Risk-adverse defenders of tort 
liability might prefer to take their chances with preemption as it now 
exists, which the Supreme Court occasionally deems no obstacle to 
plaintiffs,201 rather than seek a pro-plaintiff rewrite that might tempt 
Congress to wipe out products liability categorically.  
This misgiving noted, implied reverse preemption is desirable 
even at the level of trench-war realpolitik. Like Betsy Grey, who faced a 
similar dilemma when she proposed to “make Congress speak clearly” 
every time it wants to preempt,202 I hope that compelling candor on the 
part of Congress would permit liability to coexist with codified 
regulation as a source of safety.  Over the years since the tort reform 
movement began, Congress has declined to enact more proposed curbs 
  
 198 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, 
JEOPARDY 133 (1982); see also supra notes 172-176 (reporting the protestations of CPSC chairman 
Nancy Nord, to the effect that giving the agency more money and prerogatives would lower 
consumer safety). 
 199 Winokur & Robbins, supra note 106, at 233-35 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 1 (1824)). 
 200 See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903 (2006) 
(immunizing gun manufacturers and sellers from criminal misconduct involving their products); 
General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006) (imposing a federal statute 
of repose, cutting off liability for defective aircraft after 18 years on the market). What became 
known as the Cheeseburger Bill, or more formally the Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption 
Act, H.R. 544, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), which Congress did not pass but whose restrictions 
several states did enact, would have precluded claims against restaurants for weight-related injuries 
from the food they sold.  
 201 See Wyeth, Inc. v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. 
Ct. 538, 541 (2008); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 452-53 (2005); Sprietsma v. 
Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65-69 (2002); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286-90 
(1995).  
 202  Grey, supra note 21. 
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on liability than it has codified.203 Should this pattern come to an end, and 
comprehensive liability-killing legislation enter the United States Code, I 
doubt that judicial recognition of retreats from preemptive intent will be 
the culprit. A doctrine of implied reverse preemption is more likely to 
foster awareness within Congress of the relation between its work 
product (for this purpose, new statutory language and appropriations) and 
liability. 
Now, the more radical extension. Like implied preemption, the 
doctrine of implied reverse preemption has what I have called markers. 
Judges would frame and apply criteria for this legal conclusion just as 
they have framed and applied criteria for the conclusion of preemption. I 
have suggested a few available to courts, nominating two broad 
categories: amendments that move away from an earlier regulatory 
agenda and de-funding of the agency empowered to enforce safety 
statutes.204  
Markers from Congress—though inadequate as currently used 
for implied preemption205—are a source of transparency and fairness for 
implied reverse preemption.  As a matter of due process, manufacturers 
are entitled to notice about any shift in their status that removes an 
affirmative defense. Whenever old conclusions of preemption that had 
once sheltered them are no longer present, they have a right to know. 
Injured persons and their lawyers are entitled to the same information. 
Under a judicial regime that accepts implied reverse preemption, these 
persons and entities would keep alert to the indicators of retreat that 
Congress can manifest: amendments moving away from old regulatory 
agendas and de-funding of the agencies authorized to regular under 
federal statutes. Attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants will know 
when the ground has given way under a preemption fortress. 
The central criterion of intelligibility would also permit another 
application of the implied reverse preemption doctrine, one available to 
judges who accept the thesis of this Article. I have argued that any court 
competent to infer preemption is also competent to infer a retreat from 
preemption. The same competence can alter express preemption. As was 
noted, the line between express preemption and implied preemption is 
not bright: when the Supreme Court finds express preemption in a 
statutory clause that prohibits contrary state regulation, it uses inference, 
rather than explicit language from Congress, to deem tort liability a form 
of regulation.206 Nuance and ambiguity, in other words, are present in 
express preemption as well as implied preemption. Implied reverse 
  
 203 See generally Anita Bernstein, A Model of Products Liability Reform, 27 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 637, 660-62 (1993) (describing the tendency of proposed federal tort reforms to be diluted 
before enactment).  
 204 See supra Part III.B. 
 205 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 206 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 
505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).  
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preemption could empower judges to return to old holdings that tort 
liability is expressly preempted, inferring from circumstantial evidence 
that a clause in a statute forbidding inconsistent state regulation has lost 
its inferred meaning of “no tort liability,” and so a personal injury claim 
can proceed. This mode of reading statutes places language once deemed 
as expressly preemptive within reach of judicial reinterpretation.207 
A decision by the United States District Court of the District of 
Massachusetts provides an example of how judges can give effect to a 
congressional retreat from express preemption. In Andrews-Clarke v. 
Travelers Insurance Company,208 “one of the classic broadsides” against 
preemption by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”),209 the court noted with regret that Congress had expressly 
preempted the tort and contract claims that the plaintiff tried to bring.210 
“Congress intended to relieve employers and ERISA plans from the 
burdens of compliance with conflicting state laws not as an end in and of 
itself,” wrote Judge Young, “but rather as a means to promote the 
principal object of ERISA as a whole,” i.e. protecting plan participants.211  
Back in 1974, according to Judge Young, “ERISA did provide an 
adequate remedy for the wrongful denial of health benefits. The present 
gap in remedies is therefore attributable . . . to the failure of Congress to 
amend ERISA’s civil enforcement provision to keep pace with the 
changing realities of the health care system.”212 
Implied reverse preemption recognizes, as did Judge Young, the 
existence of “changing realities”213 that render obsolete an earlier 
conclusion that Congress cut off, expressly or by implication, the 
opportunity for an injured person to seek redress in a state court. Diane 
Andrews-Clarke had to do without a remedy for the harm she suffered; 
Judge Young implored Congress to modify what he called “a law that 
has gone conspicuously awry from its original intent,” adding, “Does 
anyone care? Do you?”214 This Article has argued that Judge Young had 
in his hands the interpretive tool for which he longed. Any power to draw 
an inference favoring defendants necessarily includes the power to draw 
an inference favoring plaintiffs.215 
Judicial determinations of preemption not only may, but should, 
evolve in response to new circumstantial evidence that Congress has lost 
  
 207  See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 46 (arguing that the meaning of statutory 
language can change over time). 
 208  984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997). 
 209 E-mail from Anthony Sebok, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 
to author (Feb. 16, 2009) (on file with author). 
 210  Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 55-56. 
 211  Id. at 58. 
 212  Id. 
 213  Id. at 53. 
 214  Id. at 65. 
 215  I thank Tony Sebok not only for alerting me to Andrews-Clarke but for adding a 
cogent analysis. 
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its earlier desire to thwart tort liability. What Peter Schuck has called 
“the sweet spot”216—a balance between tort and administrative rules as a 
regulatory design—varies in response to what Congress, exercising 
legislative supremacy, installs. Courts attuned to this balance will find 
implied reverse preemption just as fundamental as preemption.   
  
 216 Schuck, supra note 65.   
